Physics and Astronomy Calendar

This paper begins with the literature on “rate and direction of technical change” that developed from the work of Richard Nelson (and many others). It is common to assess the impacts of public subsidy on the ‘rate’ of technical change, generally finding a positive role for public funding (e.g. Kenneth Flamm 1988; National Research Council 1999). But it is less common to assess the impacts of public subsidy on the ‘direction’ of technical change, e.g. the multiple branching paths and alternate technical designs that typically exist while technologies are under development. This is odd since theorizing in evolutionary economics offers many pertinent concepts: variation and selection (see Ziman 2000) as well as the ‘path dependence’ and ‘lock in’ concepts of Brian Arthur.

This paper then analyzes the generally positive but curiously linear assessment of the military’s role in promoting technical changes. In his recent book, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? (Oxford 2006), Vernon Ruttan examines six general-purpose technologies; here, I focus on his treatment of the computer and semiconductor industries. Briefly, his argument is that massive military support resulted in technical innovations and productivity growth that would not have occurred -- or not at the same rate -- given only private-sector actors and initiatives. While his analysis is informed and historically attentive, equaling that of Nathan Rosenberg on the history of technology, the ‘direction’ dimension slips out of focus.

The paper next scrutinizes the linkages and assumptions underlying Ruttan’s appendix on “Computers, Microprocessors, and the Internet: a Counterfactual History.” While I deeply admire his advocating narrative analysis, he has imported into his analysis a number of consequential historiographic oversights: e.g. there was no civilian market for transistors in the 1950s; the oft-repeated belief that IBM was computer-averse; and a subtle mistake that the civilian airline reservation system SABRE was a ‘spin-off’ from the military project SAGE. In correcting these points, I suggest alternative scenarios and try to make explicit the linkages and assumptions and how they influenced both the 'rate' and the 'direction' of technical change in this sector.

The conclusion outlines my thoughts on developing analytical scenarios of technology development, stressing equally the dimensions of ‘rate’ and ‘direction’. Finally, I suggest an implication of this analysis for next-generation work in technology assessment and technology forecasting.