Physics and Astronomy Calendar

Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization, yet there is little consensus on some of the most basic questions about idealization, or even the best characterization of the practice. Despite this high degree of variation, some consensus has clustered around three types of positions, or three kinds of idealization. I will argue that all three kinds of idealization play important roles in scientific research traditions. There is no single purpose for idealization and hence there is not a single set of rules that theorists ought to follow when idealizing. While all three kinds of idealization can be found in scientific practice, they share enough in common that they can be characterized and studied in a unified way. The key is to focus not just on the practice and products of idealization, but on the goals governing and guiding it. I call these goals the representational ideals of theorizing and although they vary between the three kinds of idealization, attending to them gives a more unified picture of the practice.